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Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations : Crisis or Transition ?

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INTRODUCTION

Since World War II multilateral negotiation represents a main instrument to build, and to sustain, the multitude of international regimes that have strongly contributed to the stability of the international system. A common assessment is that the success of regime-building processes has been conditioned by the leadership of the United States (Kindleberger, 1973). According to this view Washington has taken the initiative to start most of the significant international regime-building processes concerning military as well as non-military matters. American policy-makers and diplomats have repeatedly led negotiations to a successful outcome. US political power has been a prerequisite for the effective implementation of numerous international agreements. Therefore, an alarming observation is that in recent years the US role as the natural lender in many multilateral negotiations has become increasingly questioned, including amongst the American political elite itself. Both the willingness and the capacity of Washington to steer negotiations towards a constructive agreement has allegedly diminished, perhaps to a dangerously low level (Keohane, 1980).

Since the arrival of the Reagan Administration in Washington in the early 1980's the US attitude towards multilateral institutions has grown increasingly critical and has become more and more concerned with short term benefits. Washington has seemingly grown less and less willing to make costly political or economic investments in order to develop international collective goods. One manifestation of this increasingly national policy-orientation has been the withdrawal from certain UN institutions like, for instance, UNESCO. Other evidence has been the notable change of US diplomatic behavior from offensive leadership to a more cautious and defensive posture in important multilateral processes of negotiation (Imber, 1989 ; Ahnliid, 1996 ; Hart, 1995).

Two cases that will be examined in this essay are the last multilateral negotiation under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT)—the Uruguay Round—and the current multilateral talks concerning Climate Change. In both cases the absence or presence of American leadership has strongly influenced the process. The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) started in a fashion that immediately recalled earlier negotiations in GATT. The United States played an important leading role in initiating these new multilateral trade talks. Likewise, Washington performed a major part in setting the agenda and directing the negotiation towards an outcome that would reinforce the international trade regime. However, when the Uruguay negotiations reached their endgame around 1989 the US role in the process had changed dramatically. Instead of acting as a determined leader the US now performed more like a *process braker* (Sjöstedt, 1993; Zartman, 1994). The issue of financial services offers a good example. This was one of the topics that Washington had promoted the strongest in the early stages of the Uruguay Round. In the endgame the US had, in contrast, become virtually isolated in its insistence on *fair trade* stipulations (specific reciprocity)—a position that was clearly in contradiction to the fundamental GATT principle of non-discrimination which Washington had evoked with such conviction when the agenda for the Uruguay Round was set about ten years earlier (Ahnliid, 1996). The considerable influence of the United States prevented rather than promoted an agreement.

Similarly, in the global negotiations on Climate Warming the US has recently performed more like a *braker* than as a *leader*. Washington has refused to make firm commitments to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere; a position which is largely explained by the strong dependence of the US economy on the production, sales or consumption of fossil fuels (Deland, 1991). The official argument for the US stance has been that existing scientific knowledge about climate warming and its consequences remains insufficient to motivate the extremely costly measures, which are required to reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to a satisfactory level. This US position has led the climate negotiations into an impasse. No other country, or group of nations, has been able to break this deadlock (Hart, 1995; Michel, 1996).

For the academic analyst of international affairs faltering US leadership in contemporary multilateral processes has not been a complete surprise. Already in the 1970's a debate developed concerning what was then called the problem of *hegemonic stability*, that the preservation of an open—liberal—world economic-political system required that it was continuously defended and supported by a dominant Great Power. The oil crisis of 1973 had been a stark indication that

American international dominance of the world economic/political system was threatened. An assessment of selected indicators confirmed that US issue-specific power in areas like trade, investment or energy was indeed diminishing (Keohane & Nye, 1977, Krasner, 1991). At the same time there were no indications that the EU, Japan or any other nation would replace the US as a hegemon in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the theory of collective goods also predicted that cooperation between a small number of Great Powers—e. g. the US; the EU and Japan—could not easily substitute for the leadership provided by a single hegemon (Olson, 1965),

Leaning on the theory of collective goods and related thinking on coalition-building a number of authors have asserted that the gradual decline of US hegemony represents a mounting threat to international, liberal regimes. The gist of the argument is that the persuasion of a hegemon is needed to make a sufficiently great number of governments forego short-term gains in order to attain more important long term benefits derived from the collective goods generated by global regimes. Only a hegemon would be forceful enough to keep potential free riders in line. No other state than a hegemon would be willing to accrue the costs necessary for the management and policing of liberal regimes (Gilpin, 1987 ; Lake, 1988 ; Baldwin, 1993).

If the above assessment of the changing international power distribution is correct the prospect for future global cooperation and regime operation in areas like trade, finance, monetary affairs or the environment is now growing increasingly grim. Regime implementation in individual countries will deteriorate. Participants of multilateral processes of negotiation will find it more and more difficult to reach meaningful agreements. The main question addressed in this essay is whether there are any conceivable, realistic remedies for the suggested problems of leadership in multilateral talks. The objective of the study is, however, not to try to answer this query comprehensively but only to elucidate it with the help of one particular theoretical approach, which may be referred to as *role analysis*.

The typical study of hegemonic stability pertained to the system level of analysis and was primarily concerned with changes of structural power. The functions of the hegemon in international cooperation were only conceived of in very general terms. The particular context of inter-state negotiation was not explicitly considered. The focus was set particularly on the implementation of

international treaties and the crucial mission of the hegemon to serve as an international "ranger" in this regard. This question has lately been extensively discussed in the rapidly growing literature on the implementation of international treaties (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Leadership in regime-building through negotiation remains a much more neglected subject which has seldom been discussed in depth. An important exception is the conceptual analysis by Arild Underdal in one of the very few theory-oriented books dealing with multilateral negotiation, *International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the Management of Complexity* edited by William Zartman (Zartman, 1994). The Underdal seminal article draws from the organization-focused literature on leadership and demonstrates its high relevance for the analysis of multilateral negotiation. Underdal introduces a useful theoretical outlook on multilateral leadership. He proposes a demand-supply perspective which emphasizes the importance of the interaction between *leader* and *follower* in the dynamics of leadership. A distinction is made between different modes of leadership, such as *coercive* and *instrumental leadership*, "While coercion basically comes down to imposing one actor's preferences on some other(s) or preventing others from doing so to others, instrumental leadership is essentially a matter of finding means to achieve common goals" (Underdal, 1994, p. 187). Finally, the theoretical framework developed by Arild Underdal indicates useful approaches for the identification of the positive conditions for leadership (Ibid.).

The Underdal approach to multilateral leadership represents the basic, theoretical point of departure for the present study. However, this framework needs to become extended and further elaborated in order to better clarify the key question of this study: what is required by a state—or an international organization—striving to perform a leadership role in a multilateral negotiation? The essential objective of the Underdal essay was to argue for the usefulness of a leadership perspective in the study of multilateral negotiation. For this reason his theoretical categories are general and do not directly permit the determination of exactly what kinds of action performed by influential actors in multilateral negotiation manifest leadership as distinguished from other types of state behavior. The method chosen to address this analytical problem is to conceive of leadership as *a role*, which a particular country or organization can—or cannot—perform in a given negotiation. *Role* is understood as *a recurrent pattern of behavior of states or organizations participating in a negotiation which can be attributed a distinct meaning in the process*. For example, a state or organization may perform the role of *mediator*. In this case "the recurrent pattern of behavior" would be "--(the) direct conduct of negotiation between parties at

issue on the vast proposals made by the mediator".¹ The "distinct meaning" of this "recurrent pattern of behavior" identifying the mediator role is that an attempt is made to narrow, or bridge, the gap between differing proposals or positions expressing contention between two or more other parties.

One objective of this study is to clarify what is typical for "the recurrent pattern of behavior" associated with *the performance of a leadership role* in a multilateral process of negotiation. In this exploratory analysis the Uruguay Round and the global negotiations on Climate Change will serve as empirical reference cases. *A second objective* of the study is to discuss the necessary conditions for the performance of a leadership role, or rather how these terms are to be specified by means of research.

THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS : A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Arild Underdal offers a general definition of *leadership*, which represents a suitable point of departure also for this study : "– (A)n asymmetrical relation of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal over a certain period of time" (Underdal, 1994, p. 178 and footnote 1). An actor providing leadership to a process of multilateral negotiation may present itself "at the table" as the representative of a nation or of an international organization. Manifest leadership may express itself in various ways as indicated by Underdal's distinction between differing "modes of leadership". Hence, leadership may on some occasions manifest itself as sanctions or other types of coercive power. In other situations leadership corresponds to the development and management of a relationship of cooperation. However, leadership in operation always means that the performance of targeted actors engaged in the negotiation are guided in the direction of a final agreement.

Although the general meaning of Underdal's definition of *leadership* is quite clear it has to be specified in certain respects to serve as criterion for the identification of "patterns of behavior" indicating that a particular actor is performing a leadership role. Sometimes the performance of a leadership role is highly visible, because it is part of the formal organizational structure, which has been set up to support a multilateral negotiation. For example, in the European Union the Commission has been given the prerogative to take initiatives to start

1 Part of definition of *mediation* given in **A Dictionary of the Social Sciences** (1964), (editors : Gould, J & Kolb, W), London : Tavistock Publishers

decision-making—which is largely the same as negotiation—on all matters to be processed in the EU institutions (Gould & Kolb, 1964). Other international Secretariats have competencies similar to those possessed by the European Commission, although they are much weaker from a formal, legal point of view. For example, the Executive Bodies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have a relatively strong position in negotiations involving these Institutions (“Sisters in the Wook—”, 1991). Multilateral negotiations are usually conducted within a system of formal negotiation bodies. Sometimes these institutions may be temporary and dismantled when an agreement has been reached but they may also represent permanent international organizations. The Chairs of formal negotiation bodies are given a sort of leadership role. Hence, a major task of the Chair is to organize the work of the respective conference or committee and also to steer debate or bargaining in the committee. The competence and skill of the Chair may represent the difference between success and failure in a negotiating body. The leadership of the Chair, or of other conference officers, may vary considerably with respect to form as well as to sources of authority. Hence, Lance Antrim makes a distinction between inspirational, procedural and substantive leadership (Antrim, 1994).

Leadership roles are, however, not necessarily formalized. Indeed, in multilateral negotiations critical consultations take place in informal groups entirely outside the formal organization of the multilateral negotiation. Indeed, such informal discussions often involve only the most influential countries and concern the most sensitive or important matters. Leadership, particularly the instrumental and cooperative variety, is often practiced by means of types of actions, which may also be carried out by states that no *not* have a leader role in the process. Thus, many actions which in reality represent the performance of a leadership role are not formally acknowledged as such and may therefore be difficult to identify. A basic indicator is that leadership actions have one thing in common regardless of their form : *they all represent, or generate, influence of one actor on others*. However, influence is not the same as leadership. All nations taking active part in a multilateral negotiation are striving to influence its outcome and the various forces in the process forming it. Many poor and weak states are still virtually powerless in complex, multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, some small nations are, no doubt, successful in exercising some influence regarding some issue at least at some point during the negotiation. For most countries this influence is, however, strongly limited. Small and weak states are typically forced to focus on one or maybe a few issues of particular concern for them. For example, in the GAIT rounds many poor developing

countries concentrated all or most of their attention on the Negotiating Group on Tropical Products. Some of them were able to generate a certain amount of influence in this particular context. This influence was, however, not only relatively weak but also pertained to an issue area, that was comparatively peripheral in the process. Nations with a principal interest in Tropical Products were likely to be Followers rather than Leaders in the GATT talks (Hudec, 1988; Winham, 1986). Potential leaders are presumably to be found only amongst countries with a capacity to significantly influence developments in all, or at least many, Negotiation Groups.

Thus, *influence* is a prerequisite but not a sufficient condition for a leadership role. In order to represent leadership influence has to meet a number of qualifying conditions :²

1. **Cause of influential action.** Leadership requires something more than incidental influence. Leadership is based on calculated actions aimed to drive the process of negotiation in a desired direction.
2. **Continuity of influential action.** A strong leader of a multilateral negotiation should be able to guide the whole process from initiation to agreement. However, leadership may be exercised by a certain actor only during limited stages of the negotiation.
3. **Purpose of influential action.** Defining *leadership* in multilateral talks Arild Underdal states that “—the leader exercise(s) —positive influence, guiding rather than vetoing, collective action. Thus, leadership is associated with the collective pursuit of some common good or joint purpose” (Underdal, 1994, p. 178), Accordingly, actions by an actor which disrupt or stop a negotiation do not represent leadership even if their impact on the process is great and this effects deliberately designed. The search for manifestations or a leadership role should concentrate on actions by states, organization or other actors that tend to facilitate the negotiation or otherwise pave the way for a final agreement.
4. **The scope of influence.** Leadership action may be directed towards individual parties. However, typical and special for leadership is the simultaneous impact on several parties. Ultimately, leadership action has a *process impact* ; it has consequences for the process as whole.

2 These conditions need to be clarified by means of research. The propositions in the text should be regarded as indicative and hypothetical.

A summary of the observations above is that the role of leadership is manifested by non-incidental actions of states or organizations, which have an intended, beneficial process impact and which are not isolated to a particular event. Such actions may be framed in highly different ways depending, for example, on the influencing method chosen by the actor performing as a leader ; coercion or instrumental cooperation. The prevailing external conditions also matter. In this regard *the character of the negotiation process itself* is of particular significance. As pointed out by William Zartman the essence of multi-party negotiation is the “management of complexity” pertaining to issues as well as the number of actors involved (Zartman, 1994). These circumstances make it necessary for negotiating parties to deal with issues in several different ways before an agreement can be concluded. In fact, the multilateral process may be broken up into a number of stages recurring in every negotiation, each of which is characterized by a particular kind of state interaction. *Agenda-setting* begins with the initiation of the process of parties summoned to the negotiation table for the task of coping with a certain problem or problem area. Further phases of agenda-setting specify what topics are going to be negotiated, and how these issues are going to be defined and approached in the negotiation. Often general goals for the negotiation are established simultaneously, as well as an organizational structure. *Formula* refers to the choice of a specific approach to problem-solving and agreement. *Detail* means bargaining over specific and limited issues usually within the constraints of the formula. Finally, *termination* brings the whole process to an end with the conclusion of a final agreement (Zartman & Berman, 1982 & Hampson with Hart, 1995, p. 25–28).

Process stages presumably represent different conditions for state diplomacy in general as well as for leadership action. For example, agenda-setting in multilateral negotiations is typically characterized by the gathering of information, problem analysis and extensive communication between negotiation parties. In contrast, negotiation on detail is likely to occur in a relatively closed process in which parties focus on highly specified issues and exchange concessions. These stark differences of process character mean that a leader wanting to move or terminate the negotiation needs to employ different means of influence in different process stages.

SUMMARY CASE DESCRIPTIONS

The Uruguay Found and the negotiation on Climate Change have been included in the study because they are both illustrative as well as problematic as

seen in a leadership perspective. The two processes are genuinely multilateral as each of them involve at least 150 different actors (states as well as international organizations). The complexity of the agenda represents an important challenge for countries striving for leadership which is typical for regime-building at the close of the 20th Century. Agenda and process complexity was further enhanced because many issues were politically highly controversial. Finally, both cases contain elements of successful leadership as well as leadership failure. Accordingly, these two multilateral talks should represent prolific references for an exploratory case study focusing on the mechanics of, as well as the conditions for, an effective leadership role.

1. The case of multilateral trade negotiations

The Uruguay Round was formally opened at a Ministerial Meeting under the auspices of GATT in September 1986 in Punta del Este outside Montevideo.³ This conference of trade ministers had been preceded by several years of informal as well as formal pre-negotiations, which had been initiated by the United States. However, the agenda of the forthcoming Uruguay Round was to a considerable degree conditioned by the outcome of earlier multilateral trade negotiations in GATT, and especially the Tokyo round that was terminated in 1979. One main issue of the pre-negotiations of the Uruguay Round was if new GATT negotiations were necessary. Another principal question was whether the upcoming negotiations should deal with a number of new trade issues that had hitherto not been covered by GATT, trade in services, intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment. A large group of Developing Countries opposed this proposal. A number of formal compromises were needed to solve these problems. For example, for all practical purposes services became part of the agenda but was formally kept outside the GATT context. The agenda also included the whole spectrum of traditional GATT issues, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. The organization set up to handle the negotiation consisted of about fifteen Negotiation Groups and two decision making councils for horizontal issues, one of which was particularly concerned with services. About two years were dedicated to issue clarification and technical problem-solving, before substantive talks got under way. The general objective for the negotiation was to increase international market access on equal competitive terms by reducing various kinds of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. During

3 For a summary descriptions of the Uruguay Round see, for example, Hampson with Hart, 1995, Sjöstedt, 1994, Winham & Kizer, 1993; and GATT Activities

the process the GATT Secretariat gave substantial collective technical support to negotiation parties. Negotiations could be terminated in 1990 as scheduled in the formal plan for the Uruguay Round. The Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, intended to conclude the trade talks, managed only to settle some of the remaining negotiation problems. Binding liberalization commitments with regard to agricultural goods and services represented two of the most difficult areas. After Brussels followed four years of protracted negotiation characterized by relative stalemate. The various attempts that were made to undo the impasse were only marginally successful. A principal reason why a settlement was eventually reached was probably that a failure of the Uruguay Round would have threatened the credibility of the whole GATT regime. Issue complexity contributed to delay a successful end of the Uruguay negotiations. However, the main stumbling blocs were of a political nature. The North–South conflict of interest was a constant undercurrent of the process. The dispute between the US and the EU pertaining to a large part of the agenda was crucial. As long as Brussels and Washington could not settle their differences it was impossible to conclude the Uruguay Round with a constructive agreement. The transformation of GATT into WTO—the World Trade Organization—represented a sort of general face-saving device that facilitated the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.

The case of climate change negotiations

Negotiations on climate change originated from alarming reports from the international scientific community.⁴ The first pre-negotiations were organized by authoritative elements of the international scientific community. Some analysts would argue that the start of the negotiations on climate warming was the result of a successful operation of a powerful “epistemic community”. One very early beginning of the pre-negotiations was the major Climate Change research project that was launched by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in the mid-1970’s (Michel, 1996, p. 5). Another step forward in the process was the 1979 First World Climate Conference organized by UNEP in collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Analytical work highlighted in the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) was also important in the processes of collective learning putting Climate Change on the international agenda generally (Ibid.). A Scientific Committee on the

4 The description of the case of Climate Change draws heavily from Michel, 1996. For other general descriptions see Hart, 1995 and Houghton *et al*, 1990.

Problems of the Environment, set up by ICSU, UNEP and WMO indicated an increasingly sharper focus for the international discussions on Climate Change. The Final Document of the Villach Conference organized by the Scientific Committee stated that there was a need for a global convention addressing Climate Change (Ibid., p. 6).

When more organized consultations on Climate Change got under way they unfolded on three different tracks; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention for Climate Change (INC) and the United Nations Conference On Environment and Development (UNCED). UNEP and WMO jointly created IPCC in 1988. Organized in three Committees the task of IPCC was to analyze the climate problem as such, to identify its social, economic and other consequences and to assess appropriate responses. Particularly, the Science report produced by the world scientific community had a great impact and paved the way for the creation of INC, which was established by the UN General Assembly in December 1990 (Resolution 45/212). INC was a more traditional negotiation body than IPCC, as participating nations were represented by diplomats and experts from the capitals. The task given to INC was to negotiate a convention on Climate Change to be finally accepted at the UNCED Summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. Climate was part of the agenda of UNCED, but was not really negotiated in preparatory process. Still, developments in UNCED probably had a noteworthy impact on the Climate negotiations in INC. Through the comparatively transparent UNCED process climate warning, as well as other environmental problems, were highlighted in the eyes of large elements of the general public. The attention given to Climate Change in the media as well as in a great number of Non-Governmental Organizations put some pressure on negotiators in INC.

The Framework Agreement for Climate Change, that was signed in 1992 has sometimes been regarded as a failure as it did not contain binding commitments by signatory governments to cut their emissions of CO₂ or other greenhouse gases. The Framework Agreement was more like a platform for continued negotiation on Climate warming. The main accomplishment of the Framework Agreement was to identify the elements of a future, viable Climate Convention. Discussions in INC after the Rio Meeting have not yet moved negotiating parties to make pledges with regard to emissions of CO₂. However, the first formal Meeting of the Parties to the Framework Agreement in Berlin 1995 designed a concrete plan for the reduction of greenhouse gases that is meant to be

confirmed at their next meeting in Kyoto, Japan.

LEADERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN THE CASE STUDY NEGOTIATIONS: AN EXPLORATORY INVENTORY⁵

A conclusive study of how a particular actor performs as a leader in a multilateral negotiation has to take into account that external conditions for such a role may vary considerably between process stages. One implication is that the methods of influence governments use are likely to differ across process stages. Another likely consequence is that the relative capacity of a country to perform a leadership role may likewise differ from one process stage to another. A critical element of a capacity for effective leadership may be the capability to easily change leadership methods and style as the negotiation process unfolds. Leadership studies should, therefore, be comprehensive and include the entire negotiation process. However, the exploratory nature of this investigation motivates a somewhat simplified version of this approach. The two cases of multilateral negotiation will be looked into through three *windows of analysis* each of which represents a separate process stage. The first "window" focuses on *agenda-setting* including "initiation", a phase of the negotiation that might have been considered to make up a process stage of its own. The second and third windows pertain to *negotiation for formula* and *endgame bargaining* respectively,

First Window of Analysis: Agenda setting

In the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations the United States played a crucial leadership role with regard to *initiation* and *agenda-setting*. Like in earlier GATT rounds an important element of initiation diplomacy was consultations organized and led by Washington within an initially small but eventually growing group of key trading nations. Hence, US initiation diplomacy first concentrated on talks with the EU and Japan, and then involved other significant trading nations like Canada before discussions became multilateralized. This early phase of agenda-setting terminated in 1984/85 with a

5 The analysis of leadership activities is based on the above descriptions of the two cases. Furthermore, the analysis is also based on data which have been gathered in two still unreported research projects, in which the author is currently involved. One project concerns the processes that changed the GATT into the WTO. The project is carried out in collaboration between the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish universities in Lund and Umeå. The second project is a joint effort of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the universities of Uppsala and Umeå in Sweden and the Johns Hopkins University in Washington D. C. The project analyses international, environmental governance, Michel, 1996 has been produced within this project.

general call for participation in a Preparatory Committee set up to organize the future Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este. The invitation was directed to members of the GATT regime, Contracting Parties and Observers.⁶

The process of *coalition-building* with like-minded countries supporting a new GATT round was substantially bolstered with technical argumentation concerning the need to reinforce the international trade regime. Knowledge and current information about the status of the system to carry this diplomatic argumentation was largely available within the highly competent ministries and central agencies shaping the American trade policy. However coalition-building was also dependent on the production and dissemination of new consensual knowledge, particularly related to the so-called new trade issues, services trade as well trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) and direct investments (TRIMS). Economic scientific knowledge (or acknowledged theory) was needed to demonstrate, first, that new issues had a genuine character of international trade and, second, that they could be integrated into the GATT legal framework.

Thus, one important element of US leadership action targeting like-minded countries, primarily the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), was to initiate and coordinate knowledge-building and issue analysis regarding relevant trade matters in these nations. OECD itself had an important role to perform in this context, particularly in the earliest phases of agenda-setting. When the pre-negotiations for the Uruguay Round started, a large coalition of Developing Countries successfully opposed the inclusion of the so-called new trade issues, and especially services trade, in the GATT framework. Therefore, OECD represented an important instrument for coordination and exchange of information amongst Industrialized Countries.

Another important element of US leadership strategy in agenda-setting was to try to break down the loose coalition of developing countries resisting the introduction of the new issues and, for that reason, obstructing the planning for a new GATT round. In this regard conventional, bilateral diplomacy probably had an important part to play. This kind of diplomatic intercourse largely took place outside the GATT context. However, once an organizational structure was established to serve the pre-negotiations for the Uruguay Round this institution became an important arena for the struggle between those countries that

⁶ An *observer* country was not fully integrated into the GATT regime. It could either represent a country incapable of honoring all the obligation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or countries that were still in the process of becoming Contracting Parties.

avored a new GATT round and those that did not, the so-called "dissidents". In this diplomatic game one of the main issues was whether the so-called new trade issues (services, TRIPS and TRIMS) could be negotiated in the GATT. Legal argumentation based on references to the GATT treaty was an important component of the argumentation brought forward at the negotiation table by the dissidents that were informally led by Brazil and India. The dissemination of new economic-scientific knowledge demonstrating that the new issues did indeed pertain to the issue area of trade was an important instrument to weaken the legal position on which the dissident negotiation strategy was based. The US had a leading role in undermining the "dissident" position.

The establishment of the Preparatory Committee preparing for Punta del Este was a clear sign that the "dissidents" were not strong enough to veto, or deter, a new GATT round. The proceedings at the Ministerial Meeting in Uruguay demonstrated that the leading developing countries were much more assertive and influential than they had been in any earlier GATT round.⁷ However, the outcome of Punta del Este also established that the coalition of developed countries, which at this point was still led by the United States, also prevailed in the important dispute concerning the "new trade issues", as they were included in the agenda for the forthcoming Uruguay Round. At the same time the result of Punta del Este also demonstrated that the "dissidents" had real political clout as special procedural and institutional arrangements had to be made for the new issues. Thus, the agreement made at Punta del Este accepted liberalization negotiations on trade in services and the other new trade issues. However, the same agreement also stipulated that these talks should be kept separate from the negotiations on goods and for that reason be conducted in special negotiating bodies that were formally not part of the GATT system. The underlying meaning of these procedural rules was that the results of the multilateral negotiations on the new trade issues could not be automatically included in the GATT legal system.

The United States continued its role of crucial leadership also after Punta del Este, although under slightly new and more favorable conditions. Once the formal decision had been taken to start the Uruguay Round negotiations were transferred to Geneva and for all practical purposes also to GATT. Negotiations were soon conducted within an elaborate network of formal institutions including specialized Negotiating Groups for all issue areas including the "new

7 In the two earlier multilateral negotiations, the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, developing countries had been virtually excluded from initiation and agenda-setting negotiations.

trade issues", that were formally negotiated outside GATT. A Chairperson was selected for each of these bodies with a mandate to manage and procedurally direct negotiation. The Ministerial Declaration signed at Punta del Este included general objectives and a fairly specified frame of reference for the forthcoming negotiations. Activities related to agenda-setting continued within this framework for some time after Punta del Este. This work was to a large extent managed and guided by individuals representing the formal negotiation organization, Secretariat officials and committee chairpersons. For example, the chairperson established a work program and a schedule for his—or her—committee and watched over its implementation. The GATT Secretariat recorded the discussions held at committee sessions, provided necessary background information to the committee work process and at some points, and with regard to some issues, also summarized the positions taken by individual negotiating parties.

The contributions of committee chairpersons and the GATT Secretariat to the process of agenda-setting clearly facilitated the negotiation process. However, although this influence evidently was quite significant it did not represent genuine leadership as it was constrained, indeed controlled, by negotiating parties. The influence of the GATT Secretariat in the negotiation process is easily underestimated. Nevertheless, the Secretariat was not permitted to take any initiative of its own. In principle, the support provided by the Secretariat was invariably the result of work commissioned by negotiating parties. Formally, committee chairpersons may appear to have had more leeway than Secretariat officials but in reality their political room of manoeuvre was very narrow. Everything a chairperson did to influence the negotiation process needed approval by negotiating parties.

The direction of agenda-setting and issue clarification was primarily given by the interaction of negotiation parties participating in the Uruguay Round. State contributions to this process were essentially of two different types, submission of prepared papers or oral statements "at the table". The interventions made by individual participants varied considerably depending on issue, countries involved or external conditions. However, altogether state submissions constituted a certain pattern. The work in the Negotiation Groups was driven by proposals put forward by a few leading countries and particularly the EU and the US. The submissions of these countries framed agenda-setting discussions. Other countries made proposals that added information, clarified arguments or suggested compromise solutions to conflicts of interest regarding

minor issues. However, all these interventions were ultimately motivated, and constrained by the submissions made by the Great Powers.

The creation, dissemination and employment of science-based consensual knowledge was of critical importance also in the initiation of *the global negotiations on climate Change*. The role and significance of the scientific community was quite different than it had been in the of the Uruguay Round. In the latter case theory-oriented academic economists had contributed to facilitate the definition of the new issues (services, TRIPS, and TRIMS) as trade. However, in the Uruguay Round national governments had controlled pre-negotiations and given them their direction. The Climate negotiations had been initiated and driven by elements of the international scientific community supported by a few international organizations concerned with environmental issues.

At first the international talks about the need for a climate convention were highly fragmented and developed in several countries. These discussions can be traced back to 1957–1958, the International Geophysical Year (Michel, p. 2). The Climate issue was on the agenda of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment but did generate any particular political action. However, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP)—a result of the Stockholm Conference—immediately became strongly engaged in the problem area of climate change. One manifestation of this interest on the part of UNEP was the research programs related to Climate Change and the First World Climate Conference in 1979 organized jointly with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

Together with the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) UNEP and WMO provided important elements of leadership to the early, and still informal, pre-negotiations related to Climate Change. More resources were allocated to research on the causes and consequences of Climate Warming. The organizations supplied instruments for the coordination of research. They also contributed to concentrate the focus of international consultations. As UNEP and WMO are intergovernmental organizations they also represented an interface for the communication between the research community and policy-makers at the national or international level. The Scientific Committee on the Problems on the Environment, sponsored by ICSU, UNEP and WMO, was a concrete manifestation of the organizational support to the scientific community. Eventually, in 1988 these efforts resulted in the creation of a special forum for international discussions about the Climate problem involving national governments; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) created by UNEP and WMO.

At the end of the 1880's national governments had become increasingly involved in the international talks about Climate Change. For example, in several countries governments organized or sponsored policy-oriented conferences on this topic. The general purpose of such seminars was typically to highlight the seriousness of the Climate problem and assess its causes and effects. One important consequence of the establishment of IPCC was that it organized, formalized and multilateralized international consultations on Climate Change. For example, the three committees of IPCC dealing with scientific assessment, consequences of greenhouse gas emissions and responses respectively had chairpersons selected on the basis of nationality. The work of IPCC mobilized political support for the Climate issue outside this institution. One notable example is the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and Climate Change in 1989 organized by the Dutch government. The conference involving 66 countries recommended that developed countries stabilize their CO₂ emissions as soon as possible. The Noordwijk meeting was a sort of Summit meeting on the Climate issue with 24 developed and developing countries, and it had been organized by the governments of three particularly interested countries, France, the Netherlands and Norway.

With IPCC solidly engaged in the Climate pre-negotiations, several governments undertook various measures to build up support for the formal negotiations on a future Climate convention. However, it seems that no nation, or group of countries, performed as a leader in this early stages of the process. The outcome of the review of the work of IPCC, that took place in 1990, is clearly indicative in this regard. At this point only the committee responsible for the scientific assessment of the problem of Climate Change as such had produced significant results. The authority of the IPCC's scientific assessment was due to the fact that it had been produced by an interdisciplinary and competent world scientific community. By confirming that climate warming is a real problem with the help of scientific models and facts IPCC produced a strong motive for negotiations on this topic, that recalcitrant countries found difficult to resist. At the same time the IPCC models implicitly more or less determined the agenda for the anticipated negotiations. IPCC provided a clear focus for the negotiations and provided carefully developed negotiation concepts (e. g greenhouse gases or sinks). It also very clearly indicated a negotiation approach, the reduction of emissions of, and sinks for, identified greenhouse gases. Agenda-setting had functioned as a learning process with scientists as "senders" and policy-makers as "receivers".

Second Window of Analysis : Formula negotiations

A classic feature of the GATT rounds has been formula negotiations concerning linear—across-the-board—reduction of tariffs on goods. The formula was needed to manage a highly problematic negotiation problem—how to coordinate and multilateralize the results of bilateral talks between particular significant trading nations with regard to a particular issue. The formula served as a kind of collective negotiation strategy determining general objectives (e. g average 50% cuts) taking the main concerns of principal parties of negotiation into consideration. Hence, in the case of tariff negotiations in GATT some countries were concerned about the height of existing tariff walls as well as tariff disparities. Such a linear tariff formula had been tried out unsuccessfully in the so-called Dillon Round in 1960, and was developed and applied in the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), and further elaborated and refined in the Tokyo Round (1973–1979). When the linear tariff formula was introduced into the Uruguay negotiation it was accepted with little negotiation which, furthermore, only related to various details. In contrast, formula negotiations became politically difficult and technically complex in several other issue areas, especially those concerning trade in agricultural goods and the so-called new trade issues (services, intellectual property rights and trade-related investments). In most issue areas formula negotiations in the Uruguay Round involved several, or even many, countries, and sometimes also a few international organizations. For example, a model used to compare and aggregate different types of subsidies, which had originally been developed in the OECD, represented an important input into the formula discussions in the agricultural area. In several important issue areas, for example, agriculture and services trade, different approaches to a formula were supported by the competing industrial Great Powers. Usually, the EU and the US confronted each other in these particular negotiations. For example, in the early agenda-setting negotiations the US still strived for unconditional liberalization, such as the elimination of government regulations effecting trade flows. The EU approach was to separate regulations into separate categories, and to distinguish between trade-effecting regulations that were legitimate and those that were not.

The pattern of state interaction unfolding in the formula negotiations was similar to how actors had performed when coping with agenda-setting. Committee chairpersons continued to organize negotiation work and to lead diplomatic exchange at the table. Likewise, chairpersons recurrently facilitated dispute settlement in the negotiation process by means of inter-sessional consultations. Secretariat support, in the form of circulated protocols from

formal meetings and recurrently revised negotiated texts, were seemingly indispensable. Country submissions produced ideas for technical problem-solving and clarified the controversial political issues, as well as clarifying the positions taken by individual states or coalitions active in the process. However, in the formula negotiations the main moving force in the Uruguay process continued to be the exchange of major proposals tabled by a few Great Powers. The interaction between the EU and the US was especially important in this regard. However, also some other actors like Japan and Canada contributed to frame the formula negotiation and in this sense also lead the diplomatic game. The identity of leading actors varied somewhat across issue areas and included individual states as well as coalitions of nations. For example, in the agricultural sector the coalition of free traders called the CAIRNS group belonged to the small number of actors contributing to drive the process.

The Framework Agreement for Climate Change of 1992 may be regarded as an official, negotiated formula for continued negotiations in this area. The countries particularly concerned with the problem of climate warming had wanted to reach an agreement with binding commitments by developed countries to begin reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. When it remained very unlikely that such an accord could be made before the UNCED meeting in Rio de Janeiro the Framework Agreement was developed to serve another long term objective, that is, to establish viable guidelines for how the future talks to reach an agreement on emissions should be conducted. Thus, the Framework Agreement identified the various elements that should have to be included in an effective convention regarding Climate Change. It also represented a basic commitment, negotiated in earnest as a way to reduce greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere.

The Framework agreement was negotiated between 102 countries at five sessions of INC, taking place in the period February 1991–May 1992. The principal actors of the process were national delegations, the ad-hoc INC Secretariat and the elected conference officers, Chairs of the Conference and of Working Groups. The diplomatic interaction at, and around, the table in the INC process had certain characteristics similar to those of manifested in the Uruguay Round. With the large part of the procedural questions settled at the first INC session (in Chantilly, Virginia, 4–14 February 1991), delegations started to present precise proposals for a negotiation formula at the second session of INC. It has been reported that 16 delegations contributed formal proposals to this debate on formula. It seems that three main approaches dominated this debate

and gave direction to the negotiation process. The EU argued for specific commitments to stabilize CO emissions. Japan offered a plan for "pledge and review". The idea was that each particular state should make an individual pledge to reduce CO₂ emissions to a certain degree during a certain period of time. The implementation of these pledges should be reviewed internationally according to the Japanese proposition.

A UK-US paper was tabled with a proposal for a "phased comprehensive approach" including a formula for a trade off between measures concerning emissions and sinks respectively. India, supported by other developing countries, activated the issue of financial compensation for the reduction of emissions.

Only the proposals by the EU and Japan were truly comprehensive. India was in reality concerned with detail under the assumption that developed countries would be able to reach an accord. The British intention of the text tabled jointly by London and Washington was to induce the US to make a minimum commitment concerning emission control. Neither the EU nor Japan was able to mobilize sufficient influence to be able to perform as leaders. Specifically, they could not change the US recalcitrance regarding emissions of greenhouse gases.

At the last session of INC in New York in the Spring of 1992, elected conference officers seemingly provided the necessary tactical leadership to finalize bargaining on the final text, the draft Framework Agreement. An Extended Bureau was set up temporarily consisting of conference and working group chairs as well as a few selected delegation. An extraordinary inter-sessional meeting in Paris, the Extended Bureau, managed to find a way to eliminate most of the remaining sticking points. A critical element was that the Chair of INC—with great difficulty—was able to produce general approval for a new US-British comprehensive text including a minimal commitment for emission control. The acceptance of this text paved the way for the Framework Agreement.

The INC process dealing with formula was significantly influenced by external forces. For example, both developed and developing countries strived to build up a common position by activities outside the process, for example in the OECD, in the context of the Economic Summit or at ad hoc conferences. There was seemingly also some influence from UNCED because this regime—

building effort increased the cost of failure in INC. However, the strongest and crucial influence came from IPCC. The start of INC had provided the skeleton of a formula and hence partly reduced formula-negotiation in INC to negotiation-on-detail.

Third Window of Analysis : Negotiation on detail

Like in most multilateral talks negotiation on detail in the Uruguay Round may be characterized as "editing diplomacy". When this process stage began bargaining was focused on draft texts pertaining to the various topics dealt with in the Negotiation Groups but also to a Final Text embracing the entire result of the Uruguay Round. In most interventions spokespersons for individual states, or of a coalition, wanted to safeguard a special interest by proposing or supporting a particular formulation pertaining to a specific element of the draft text. However, in some sensitive areas like, for instance, agriculture, discussion of details partly concealed the continuing conflicts of interest between the Great Powers. The dialogue between the Economic Great Powers (European Union, Japan and the United States), concerning politically important questions, was to a large extent handled outside the formal Uruguay Round institutions.

Within the formal institutions the bargaining process was closely monitored by the Chairs of Negotiation Bodies and continuously supported by the GATT Secretariat. For instance, the Chairs tried to organize consultations in such a way that controversial points could be systematically eliminated. The Secretariat summarized discussions, supplied requested information and continuously updated the texts under negotiations. Negotiation Groups reported to the major negotiation bodies, called Councils, which had a responsibility to package and integrate the results emerging in the various issue areas. Without Secretariat support or the carefully organized meeting format bargaining on detail would have been very hard to conclude in the multilateral trade talks of the Uruguay Round.

Formal management and technical support of bargaining on detail did not represent sufficient leadership to bring the Uruguay negotiations to a complete end at the Brussels Ministerial Meeting in December 1990. This aim was prescribed in the formal plan for the negotiations which had been accepted by all parties. Therefore, the time table put pressure on negotiating parties. Initially, the Brussels meeting was meant to have a ceremonial character but in reality it became a forum for endgame bargaining. Although negotiations in Brussels were conducted in earnest at the highest political level and noteworthy progress

was made in some areas, several of the remaining sticking points could not be resolved. Thus the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels ended in failure. It had been impossible to produce a comprehensive agreement.

However, new consultations restarted in early 1991, organized and led by the GATT Secretariat and its Director-General in spite of bad prospects for success. The motive was that accepted failure of a GATT round was believed to seriously threaten the credibility of the trade regime and, hence, the stability of the entire trading system. Thus, the GATT Secretariat provided the necessary leadership to keep the Uruguay Round on the rails after the Brussels Meeting. No single country or coalition of states was able or willing to shoulder the responsibility of a leader at this point. Nevertheless, the GATT leadership was not adequate to produce an agreement, or even to get serious bargaining under way. The conclusion of negotiation on detail was blocked by serious political contention. For example, several important developing countries remained opposed to the notion of bringing the so-called new trade issues into the GATT regime. The main political difficulty was, however, the discord between the US and the EC that was particularly visible and strong in the area of agriculture but which also blocked progress in other issue areas. In the previous multilateral trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), the EU–US contention had a positive impact and produced significant direction to the negotiation. Once the two economic Great Powers had reached an agreement on a particular issue in the bargaining on detail other participants become increasingly pressed to make a final commitment as well. In the Uruguay Round EU–US contention did not produce this sort of leadership effect as the two parties were not able to reach an agreement between themselves on several significant issues.

In the area of *Climate Change* the Framework Agreement of 1992 includes, and formalizes, a formula for future regime-building negotiations. This agreed formula describes the problem area and indicates the solution to be negotiated, emission reduction and sink enhancement. The formula was acknowledged, and later repeated and reinforced at the meeting with the Parties to the Framework Convention which took place in Berlin in 1985. The next step in the negotiation, moving the process towards bargaining on detail, would be to specify commitments regarding the reduction of CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere (quantities, time schedules etc.).

From a technical point of view the step from formula to bargaining on commitment and detail could be uncomplicated and straightforward. This is due to the way in which the formula was produced, based on careful scientific work

at the international level combined with organized communication with policy makers in key countries with the help of scientific networks ("epistemic communities") but particularly through IPCC and its channels to INC, the negotiating body. This procedure had several important advantages. The issue description was very clear, detailed and authoritative as it was backed up by comprehensive scientific investigations by the world, scientific community. This clarification had causes, consequences and suitable, effective counter-measures.

The IPCC leadership in the formula negotiation has, however, caused problems for transition from formula to detail. These difficulties are essentially of two kinds. First, the formula does not coherently consider various political issues. There dose, for example, the questions about the distribution of responsibility for existing concentrations greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, financial compensation to developing countries, and trade-offs related to emissions and sinks. Second, the formula does not represent sufficient underpinning political power.

BEHAVIORAL MANIFESTATIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION

The Uruguay Round as well as the Climate negotiations had a great number of participants. The climate talks at IPCC, INC and UNCEZI had several thousand participate. However, most of these states and organizations had a very peripheral or even entirely passive role. For example, most of the thirty international organizations that were invited to participate in the Uruguay Round were observers or made an occasional statement. Many nations in both the Uruguay and the Climate negotiations were followers, observers or simply nominal participants. The dynamics of the process of negotiation can in both cases be derived from the interaction of about 30 or 40 actors, states and organizations. Thus, in a very general sense these central actors can be attributed a share of a leadership role.

However, leadership in a more specific meaning is associated with a few *patterns of performance* ; coalition-building, comprehensive issue presentation, identification of joint interests, process management and process control.

1.) *Coalition-building*. It may be argued that the essence of leadership in a multilateral negotiation is activities leading to the formation of coalitions. The process includes a number of major decision points. Choices have to be made on principal issue like whether negotiations should be started, what issues should

be covered, what framework should be used for analysis and problems-solving or whether a draft for final agreement is acceptable or not. A major task of a leader of a multilateral process is to see that there is a sufficiently strong coalition in favor of propositions that move the negotiation forward or bring it to an end. This kind of coalition-building can take many forms. It may, for instance, represent lobbying to secure a majority—or consensus—for a particular formal decision, or the purpose may be to create a grand coalition that will take some responsibility for the whole process. One example would be the *Groupe de la Paix* which was created by a number of Middle Powers towards the end of the Uruguay Round when the conflict of interests between the US and the EU threatened to paralyze negotiations.

2.) *Comprehensive issue presentation.* Like many other contemporary negotiations the Uruguay round as well as the Climate negotiations were characterized by a high degree of complexity. One reason was the intricacy of the issues and another was the great number of nations, and therefore also of interests, involved in the process. Other explanations were the technical difficulty of the issues at hand, uncertainty with regard to crucial causal relationships or the lack of relevant knowledge on the part of many countries. Hence, before serious pre-negotiations had begun with regard to Climate Warming the awareness of this problem was very low in many countries. Concerning some issue areas the situation was quite similar in the Uruguay Round. For example, during the early pre-negotiation stage, US representatives argued for the inclusion of trade-related intellectual property rights into the agenda few governments were aware of their own national problems regarding “pirated goods” and related subjects. Therefore, in this kind of negotiation a crucial leadership task is to inform negotiation parties, or prospective participants, about the issues and their general significance. Once a negotiation has started and an organization has been established, agenda information may be distributed in different ways, for example, by an international Secretariat or by a special institution such as the IPCC in the Climate negotiations. Under these conditions standard Operating procedures may be employed. A much more demanding, and crucial, task is to offer a comprehensive issue presentation at the beginning of the negotiation when governments and other actors have to be convinced about the need to start new negotiations. Such information requires intensive communication between *sender* and *receiver*, as well as the capacity of the *sender* to fully understand the information needs of the *receiver* and respond to them effectively.

3.) *Identification of joint interests.* In order to influence other countries significantly *comprehensive issue presentation* often needs to be combined with a description of the joint interests served, or the collective goods that would be the result of a successful multilateral negotiations on the proposed agenda. In the case of the Uruguay Round the determination of joint interests was typically made in terms of the allegedly, generally valid doctrine—or theory—of free trade. However, for many countries an abstract presentation of the expected benefits of free trade did not automatically provide satisfactory motives for the participation in a new round of negotiation. Convincing argumentation presupposed a certain knowledge and understanding about the position and political difficulties of the particular country concerned. Again this required fairly intensive communication with flexible possibilities for constructive feedback from targeted countries.

4.) *Process management.* Multilateral talks on complex and technically difficult topics like international trade or climate warming requires a fairly developed institutional framework to allow negotiating between parties. Furthermore, negotiations require organizational support of various kinds like, for instance, the provision of secretarial staff to Negotiation Groups providing necessary documentation or supplying records from meetings. Thus, to some extent *process management* may be provided by the institutional machinery set up to assist a particular negotiation. However, it can also be anticipated that such formal organization of process management would be rather rigid without the capacity to respond flexibly and creatively to specified queries of individual countries.

5.) *Process control.* The development of a multilateral process concerning the negotiation of complex, as well as politically controversially issues, will inevitably be steered by its own inherent logic, at least to some extent. For example, the intricacy of issues will require extensive room and resources for issue clarification and technical problem-solving. An established formula may be prerequisite for conclusive negotiations on detail. The participation of a multitude of countries with differing interests and capabilities is likely to create a need for some sort of formal negotiation institution including a plan of work and a time table. The Chairs of Negotiation Groups and other bodies provide certain leadership by organizing negotiation in line with the agreed plan of work. The Chair may also influence process development in a positive way by organizing informal meetings on tricky issues with particularly interested parties. The skill of the Chair may sometimes determine whether a particular

meeting, or a work period for a Negotiating Group, is concluded successfully or not. However, ultimately the elected formal Officers of negotiation bodies are dependent on the political will of negotiating parties to work out an agreement or to establish a consensus regarding a proposal. Formal Chairs should be regarded as facilitator of a negotiation rather than genuine leaders. They can clarify sticking points, define common ground between opposing parties and indicate compromise solutions to conflicts of interest. But the Chair is in no position to put pressure on parties to make them accept a proposal. Neither can they bring radically new proposals but are constrained by parameters and restrictions that negotiating parties have established. Therefore, ultimately critical process control in a multilateral negotiations can only be exercised by one or more of the parties themselves taking on a leadership role. The typical method of this kind of leadership—bringing “political energy” into the process—is that a nation presents comprehensive proposals concerning the issue(s) currently at stake which frame the exchanges of parties and give them direction. Such leading papers typically generate submissions tabled by other parties, and may include additional suggestions, general comments, expressions of support or counterproposals. The issues at stake may be of various kinds such as the understanding of the problem at hand, a conceptual framework for issue analysis or a plan for the exchange of offers and requests.

6.) *Endgame dominance.* In a multilateral process the endgame tends to develop a character of crisis management. Typically a number of minor issues remains unsolved when the negotiations approaches its prescribed termination date. Some of these topics may, however, represent highly politically sensitive matters which are of such a nature that they can only be solved at the very end of the negotiation process. In the GATT several of these problematic endgame topics have concerned the conflict of interest between the economic Great Powers, especially the EU and the US. An unresolved issue concerning the EU and the US blocks a final agreement in the GATT/WTO. At the same time the bilateral dialogue between the US and the EU is a strong determinant of when and how the multilateral process is to be terminated.

CONDITIONS FOR A LEADERSHIP ROLE

The ultimate question addressed in this study is whether the leadership of one single, hegemonic state is necessary to reach a meaningful agreement in a complex multilateral negotiation. The assessment of the cases studied, the Uruguay Round and the Climate negotiations, does not offer any obvious

answers to this query. It is clear that in both cases the process suffered from a lack of leadership and the "braker" role performed by the United States during a considerable part of the negotiations. Both the Uruguay and the Climate negotiations remained deadlocked for long periods of time. At the same time, neither process ended in failure. In the Climate talks parties have not made any binding commitments to reduce the emission of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases, but the 1992 Framework is, no doubt, a solid platform for future negotiation. Regime-building concerning other environmental issues have also started with the establishment of a framework for future negotiations. The success story regarding ozone depletion is one example. In that case the original framework was seemingly weaker than the Climate Framework agreement. The Marrakesh Agreement terminating the Uruguay Round was very difficult to reach but once established it was heralded as the most far-reaching extension of the international trade regime after the establishment of GATT after World War II.

In the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1964–1967) the United States had acted consistently as a leader from the start to the end of the process. In neither the Uruguay Round nor in the Climate negotiations did any single actor provide this kind of continuous leadership. However, leadership was furnished to some extent at least some of the time in both processes, although by different actors, in different ways and with a varying degree of effectiveness.

The research objective of the case studies reported above has been to analyze what kind of actions represent leadership and what the basic requirements are for undertaking such action.

The above analysis of the Uruguay Round and the Climate negotiations indicate that leadership in a multilateral process is based on roughly five *sub-roles*, or patterns of performance; coalition-building, comprehensive issue presentation, determination of joint/common interests, process management, process control, trade and coercion (see Figure 1). To some extent, the sub-roles may be substitutes for one another at a given point of time. For example, a Great Power may choose to put pressure (coercion) on a number of other countries sequentially instead of trying to demonstrate the collective/joint gains associated with a given proposal at a meeting of a negotiating committee. However, the sub-roles also respond to different needs emerging in a negotiation. Such needs may, in turn, also be associated with a particular phase of the process. Hence, trading offers and requests typically pertains to the later stages of the process and the endgame. In contrast, comprehensive issue

LEADERSHIP

POWER BASE

PATTERNS OF PERFORMANCE

COMPETENCE/ RESOURCES

BACKGROUND FACTORS

Coalition-building

DIPLOMATIC
COMPETENCE

Comprehensive
issue presentation

ADMINISTRATIVE
RESOURCES

ISSUE-SPECIFIC
STATUS POWER

Determination of joint/
common interests

PROCEDURAL
PREROGATIVES

Process management

SUPERIOR
KNOWLEDGE

Process control

Figure 1 *Manifestations of and conditions for a leadership role in
Multilateral negotiation*

presentation is likely to be in demand in the process stage of agenda-setting and issue clarification.

Figure 1 includes a number of hypotheses about the conditions that a state or organization wanting to perform as a leader in a multilateral context will have to meet. These hypotheses address the question: What is the necessary *power base* for a multilateral leadership role? The case analysis indicates that the power base consists of layers. One layer is closely tied the process of negotiation; these are called *competence/resources* in Figure 1. The second layer is *issue-specific power*. The third layer, finally, pertains to *general structural power* and is referred to as status in Figure 1.

Four types of process-related competence/resources have been tentatively identified:

Diplomatic competence represent the combination quality and quantity with regard to the human and other resources directly available in a country for foreign policy action, particularly negotiation with other nations. *Administrative resources* includes various kind of back-up and support facilities related to foreign policy action directly available to a nation's government and its central authorities. *Procedural prerogatives*, potentially conditioning leadership action in a multilateral negotiation, is essentially of two kinds: formal assignment (e. g. chairperson or rapporteur) given to a national delegate or the formal task and

competence of international organizations being involved in the process. *Superior knowledge* represents access to scarce information (e.g. statistics or technical expertise) needed for the negotiation or the capacity (e.g. an advanced national, scientific community) to produce, interpret or frame such information.

Issue-specific power stems from the control of the values at stake in a negotiation, or other kind of power game. In a classic study Norwegian analyst Olav Knudsen demonstrated that in the negotiations at the so-called Liner Conferences about international shipping the issue-specific power of a nation was indicated by the amount of tonnage that it controlled. According to Knudsen the distribution of issue-specific power explained why a small country like Norway was one the most influential countries in the shipping negotiations (Knudsen, 1973). In the GATT/WTO talks the control of trade flows (e.g. measured as share of world exports) is a likely indicator of issue-specific power. In the Climate negotiations "the total emissions of greenhouse gases" is possibly the corresponding measure.

When a country possess a certain minimum share of the total distribution of issue-specific power, this represents exceptional significance which, in turn, is a likely necessary, positive condition for a leadership role. *Exceptional significance* means that if a country, or possibly a coalition of states, is excluded from an agreement, this accord is of little value for other countries. A classical example of manifest *exceptional significance* taken from the trade area is the episode when the 1947 Havana treaty concerning the creation of an international trade organization suddenly lost all its earlier significance when the US Senate refused to ratify it. In the current negotiations on Climate Change a similar situation prevails, although so far it has been more inconclusive. The similarity is, however, that a great number of countries are unwilling to make binding commitments to an agreement to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases which may not include the United States.

It is conceivable that more than one country may be of exceptional significance in the same multilateral negotiation. For example, in the multilateral trade talks it seems that the US, the EU and Japan are all of exceptional importance. An agreement in WTO excluding any of these three parties is simply not feasible and in this sense inconceivable. Various groupings of states are also likely candidates for exceptional significance in WTO, for example the large coalition of free trading agricultural exporters. A united Group of 77 also has a potential to block negotiation in WTO. The situation is

similar in the negotiations on Climate Change. The economic Great Powers are of exceptional significance, and possibly a few other countries as well.

It is, however, easier to block a negotiation than to lead it. Superior issue-specific power may be a prerequisite for a leadership role but it does *not* represent a sufficient condition for it.

Structural power is essentially a function of the possession of a military capability. The (Neo) Realist proposition about structural power is unconditional; it is supposed to be valid for all sorts of state interaction in all sorts of situations. The implication is that military strength is a key determinant also of the outcome of multilateral negotiation. Examples of such cases are not difficult to find. Here belong, for example, such talks about borders, territory or other hard security issues for which war is a realistic alternative to negotiation. Military capability presumably also gives leverage to a party of a negotiation concerning disarmament or other military issues. It is, however doubtful if military strength breeds effective influence in negotiations on non-military issues regarding conflicts of interest in which the use of force is either excessively costly or simply not instrumental. In such cases issue-specific power is evidently of a much greater importance as a source of influence than general structural power. However, it cannot be excluded that structural power does have some significance also in negotiation on trade and environmental issues. The hypothesis implied in Figure 1 is that structural power is associated with the *status* of a nation, which influences how other actors perceive and treat it. Hence, an improving status is believed to breed attention and respect from other countries.

The cases of trade and climate negotiation indicate that under some conditions a particular sub-leadership role may be bolstered by a particular competence or resource in Figure 1. For example, the *superior knowledge* of IPCC was evidently sufficient to accomplish *comprehensive issue presentation* in the climate talks. Likewise *procedural prerogatives* made it possible for the GATT Secretariat to relaunch the Uruguay negotiations after the failure of the 1990 Ministerial Meeting in Brussels.

Such simple couplings between a particular pattern of leader performance and power base element seemingly opens the way for a variety of actors to perform a constrained leadership role in multilateral processes, which is restricted to a particular situation or phase of a negotiation. For example,

international organizations may have a superior knowledge, like the IPCC has had in the climate negotiation. An actor—state or organization—with a constrained leadership capacity is not able to move the process forward for long time, but there is a possibility that a distribution of work may be established with other actors endowed with a leadership capacity, that is constrained in another way.

However, the role analysis also indicates that the constraints are formidable for actors aspiring for a leadership role. The following circumstances make it difficult for actors that are not complete Great Powers to exercise leadership :

1. Usually, the effective performance of a given pattern of leadership seems to often require a combination of several competencies/resources at the same time (e. g. diplomatic competence/superior knowledge for the determination of joint interests).
2. Often a particular pattern of performance needs to become combined with another leadership sub-rule ; one lesson from the climate case is that a problem definition based on superior—scientific—knowledge may represent a sufficient motive to begin prenegotiation, or even real negotiations. But it needs to be combined with the determination of critical joint interests if a politically feasible negotiation is to be produced in the process.
3. Process control, which is very demanding, is necessary to break an impasse or to move the negotiation from one stage to another, e. g. from formula to detail. It seems that process control to a great extent depends on issue-specific power, perhaps underpinned by structural power.

Thus, the present study has not been able to answer the question : what countries or coalitions will be able perform as leaders in future multilateral negotiations. One conclusion is, however, that concepts like structural and issue-specific power will have to remain in the analysis of leadership requirements. Another conclusion is in order to gain a radically better understanding of the leadership issue a process perspective will be necessary. In that connection the role analysis approach looks promising.

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